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THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT (Synthesis) is an initiative of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
to produce relevant, concise, and thought-provoking briefs and reports on today’s important 
health policy issues. By synthesizing what is known, while weighing the strength of fi ndings and 
exposing gaps in knowledge, Synthesis products give decision-makers reliable information and 
new insights to inform complex policy decisions. For more information about the Synthesis Project, 
visit the Synthesis Project’s Web site at www.policysynthesis.org. For additional copies of Synthesis 
products, please go to the Project’s Web site or send an e-mail request to pubsrequest@rwjf.org.
Many policy-makers support expanding health insurance coverage by providing tax credits 
to individuals with low or modest incomes to help them purchase insurance directly from 
insurers.1 Directly purchased insurance—known as individual or nongroup insurance—now 
covers 6.7 percent of the under age 65 population (11).2 
How a tax credit is used and who benefits the most from it will be determined by how the 
individual insurance market operates and is regulated, leading to several critical questions. 
Are state insurance market reforms likely to make individual insurance more available and 
affordable? Would community rating and guaranteed issue requirements increase the 
effectiveness of tax credits in reducing the numbers of uninsured? Would such reforms make 
tax credits more effective in expanding the rate of coverage for older and sicker individuals? 
In the 1990s, many states enacted laws designed to increase the availability and affordability 
of individual health insurance. Some states were responding to the possibility of an implosion 
of their individual insurance markets; others were hoping to reduce the uninsured rate or at 
least keep it from growing. State efforts met with mixed results, and in some cases, backfired.
This research synthesis distills lessons learned from these prior state reform efforts to inform 
today’s questions. We weigh available research findings, draw conclusions based on those 
findings, and note where evidence on a particular issue is lacking or inconclusive. We draw 
primarily from studies that meet professionally accepted standards for social science research. 
However, other studies that may not be as strong methodologically but have helped 
influence how people think about state insurance reforms are also examined, and we note 
their weaknesses. 
Before examining the effects of state reforms, the synthesis first addresses basic questions 
about the nature of the individual insurance market. 
•  What is the individual insurance market?
•  Who sells individual health insurance coverage?
•  How much does individual insurance cost?
•  What role do state high-risk pools play in the individual market?
•  Who buys individual coverage?
•  Why did states enact individual insurance market reforms?
•  What are state reforms designed to do?
The synthesis then summarizes research findings on the following questions:
 Did reforms increase the availability of individual insurance? Did the changes in state law 
make individual insurance more available (i.e., were there policies available for purchase), 
especially to people with higher-risk characteristics? Could anyone who wanted to buy 
an individual insurance policy, regardless of health status, prior use of health services, or 
other risk characteristics? 
 Did reforms raise or lower the cost of coverage? How did state insurance reforms affect 
the cost and affordability of individual insurance? What happened to premiums for 
average, low- and high-risk applicants?
 Did more people obtain insurance after reforms? What were the effects of the state 
reforms on coverage rates? What were the effects of state reforms on the risk character-
istics (e.g., age, sex, and health status) of the population insured? Did the state insurance 
reforms expand coverage rates for high-risk people? 
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Figure 1. Major types of state insurance reforms
Evidence on these issues is contained in studies taking one of two approaches: (1) case studies 
of one or more states, usually involving analyses of relevant laws and regulations and inter-
views with regulators, insurers, brokers and agents, and other stakeholders; or (2) quantitative 
analysis of the effects of the 50 different state laws on rates of insurance coverage and other 
outcomes that control for other factors. The quantitative (multivariate) studies mostly look 
at the effect of specific insurance reforms (e.g., community rating or guaranteed issue) or 
a bundled set of such reforms (e.g., guaranteed issue, community rating, and limits on pre-
existing condition exclusions) on total, public, and private insurance coverage rates, as well as 
uninsured rates. Only a few analyze whether the reforms increased or decreased the number 
of insurers participating in the individual insurance market. Fewer still investigate the effects 
of reforms on the age and health status of those insured in the individual market. 
Discerning the effects of state regulation on the availability and affordability of individual 
health insurance presents a difficult challenge. Only a small number of quantitative analyses 
provide point estimates of the effects of a specific type of reform or group of reforms.3 
Moreover, as discussed in Appendix II, significant methodological hurdles make it difficult to 
tease out the effects of state laws on a market also affected by many other variables, such as 
changes in federal Medicaid requirements or state economic performance. In addition, the 
reforms occurred at the same time and interact with each other, making it difficult to isolate 
the impact of each reform. Another problem is limited data allowing comparisons between 
pre- and post-reform markets. Information on the price of policies in the individual market 
is also especially weak, making it problematic to examine responses of both insurers and 
consumers to the different state regulatory initiatives. Finally, the evidence presented generally 
shows weak or no impact of less comprehensive reforms. It is unclear, however, if the limited 
reforms had no impact, or if the impact of these more limited changes could not be measured.
Despite these methodological challenges, findings across both the qualitative (case study) and 
quantitative analyses are relatively consistent about the effects of different types of reforms 
on overall insurance coverage rates. This strengthens confidence in the findings. The picture is 
less clear, however, on the questions of availability and affordability of individual insurance, 
and the risk characteristics of those who are insured by these policies. 
 
Availability
Guaranteed issue, guaranteed availability or open enrollment
Restrictions on use of pre-existing condition exclusions and waiting periods
Guaranteed renewability
Affordability
Rating bands
Modified community rating
Pure community rating
Risk Spreading 
Insurer of last resort
High-risk pool
Reinsurance pool
See glossary of insurance terms (Appendix III)
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SETTING THE STAGE: BACKGROUND ON THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET
What is the individual insurance market?
About seven percent of the under-65 population, or 17 million people nationwide, buy 
health coverage through the individual market. This rate has declined slightly since the 
mid-1990s.4 The individual insurance market is really 51 different markets, since insurers 
(carriers and managed care organizations) selling such coverage are regulated primarily by 
the states.5 Shadowed by the much larger group insurance market, the individual market 
nonetheless plays an important role as a source of health insurance for those who do not 
have employment-based coverage and are not enrolled in public programs (e.g., Medicare 
or Medicaid). 
Who sells individual health insurance coverage?
In 2001, Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS also known as the “Blues”) plans covered 57 percent of 
the individual insurance market (Figure 2), with the remainder of the market split between 
commercial insurers (23 percent) and HMOs (20 percent).6 About seven percent fewer insurers 
were selling policies in the individual market in 2001 than in 1997, a result of acquisitions, 
mergers, and the departure altogether of some insurers (4). While hundreds of insurance 
companies and health plans still sell in the individual market, only a few insurers account for 
50 percent or more of the market in any state.7
Figure 2. Individual market share by type of insurer (total U.S.), 1997 and 2001
How much does individual insurance cost?
Reliable information on the prices of individual insurance is not available. Most adver-
tised premiums—shown on insurance Web sites, for example—are for average risks at initial 
issuance, and do not reflect “rate up” charges that may be added after an applicant’s risk 
characteristics are assessed. Prices charged by a given insurer vary dramatically for the same 
package of benefits by geography, age, and sex, as well as claims experience, health status, 
prior medical history, and related factors such as occupation. The wide range of benefit pack-
ages and cost-sharing requirements offered in the market also make meaningful comparisons 
difficult. A further complication is that renewal premiums may be higher than premiums 
charged for newly issued policies. 
People with major health problems pay higher premiums for individual market coverage 
than people who are healthy. Figure 3 illustrates simulated premiums for individual insur-
ance policies for two age groups, young adults and 55-year olds, with different family size 
and health status characteristics.8 The annual premium for a healthy single 25-year-old male 
without children is about $1,200. For a family of two adults who are 55, have major health 
problems, and have two children, both with health problems, the annual premium may be 
over $14,000. 
1997 Percentage point change 1997–2001
BCBS
HMOs
Commercial insurers
U.S. Total
50%
26%
24%
100%
2001
57%
20%
23%
100%
+7
-6
-1
–
Source: Chollet, 2003
Market share
Insurer type
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Another characteristic of individual insurance is that it generally provides lower value per 
premium dollar than group and especially large group coverage in terms of benefits provided 
(29). For example, one study found that employer group health insurance paid an average of 
75 percent of all incurred health care costs for an individual while nongroup policies paid only 
63 percent (12). The lower value is due, in part, to the higher costs of marketing, 
underwriting, enrollment, and claims administration associated with individual policies. 
What role do state high-risk pools play in the individual market?
High-risk pools—available in 30 states in 2002—are an alternative source of health 
insurance for people who cannot obtain affordable individual coverage (9). Such pools 
are also referred to as “uninsurable” risk pools. Originally established by some states as the 
insurer of last resort when other sources of individual insurance were unavailable, state 
high-risk pools are now used by over half of the states to meet the guaranteed availability 
requirement under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).9 Eligibility 
rules vary, but many states require enrollees to have been denied coverage from insurance 
carriers or to have certain high-cost conditions. For individuals who are not HIPAA-eligible 
because they are either uninsured or insured under an individual policy, state laws vary on 
risk pool eligibility. 
Enrollment in state high-risk pools is modest, totaling 153,000 people in 2002—less 
than one percent of the individual market. Five state pools (California, Minnesota, Illinois, 
Wisconsin and Texas) account for 60 percent of that total. However, risk pools may become an 
increasingly important source of health insurance coverage for dislocated workers as a result 
of the Trade Act of 2002.10
Health characteristics
Non-smoker, family 
members in good health, 
policyholder has:
Excellent health, no chronic 
conditions
Minor health problems
Major health problems
1,201
1,384
1,909
3,827
4,412
6,805
1,451
1,673
2,308
4,805
5,540
7,640
Smoker, wife has health problems, 
children in fair or poor health, 
policyholder has:
Excellent health, no chronic 
conditions
Minor health problems
Major health problems
1,387
1,599
2,207
7,215
8,318
11,473
1,677
1,934
2,667
9,059
10,443
14,404
Single male Two adults, two children Single male Two adults, two children
Premiums–25 year old ($) Premiums–55 year old ($)
Source: Hadley & Reschovsky, 2003
Figure 3. Predicted premiums (dollars) by family characteristics, pooled data from 1998–2001
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At its least expensive, coverage through a high-risk pool is 25 to 50 percent more 
expensive than conventional individual insurance for an average risk person.11 Healthy 
individuals are almost always able to find less expensive coverage in the conventional market. 
However, individuals with high expected health expenditures who qualify for state high-risk 
pools may pay less than market premiums because the pool premiums are subsidized. While 
a number of factors are responsible for keeping high-risk pool enrollment low (e.g., some 
state pools have enrollment caps), a major reason is that premiums are often unaffordable, 
especially for lower-income families.12 
Who buys individual coverage? 
People who buy individual insurance are more likely to have lower incomes and to be 
self-employed, older, and not in the workforce compared to people with group cover-
age (Figure 4). A sizable portion are early retirees not yet eligible for Medicare. Although 
not shown in Figure 4, rural (nonmetropolitan) populations are more likely to have individual 
coverage than people living in more urbanized areas (5, 29). Compared with the uninsured, 
those covered by individual insurance are more likely to be older, work full time and be self-
employed, have higher incomes, and live in rural areas. More detailed results are shown in 
Appendix IV.
Figure 4. Comparison of the population characteristics of nonelderly with employment-based and 
individual insurance, 1997
A relatively high proportion of individual policyholders also report having group coverage 
in the same year, evidence of the fluidity in this market (7,12).13 This may occur because 
individual insurance serves as a stopgap measure for individuals who are between jobs or 
between school and their first job. For others, individual coverage may be the only option 
when they lose eligibility for Medicaid.
Most insurers view the individual market as a residual one covering people who cannot 
purchase health insurance through a group. This might occur because a person is unable 
to work due to illness, age, or disability, or because they are self-employed. People also tend 
to wait to apply for individual coverage until they need medical care, and then drop it when 
they do not. In contrast, a person’s decision to enroll in a group policy is usually unrelated to 
medical need but tied to the start of a new job or an employer’s decision to change insurers. 
This difference helps explain why individual insurers usually assess the health status and 
risk factors of each applicant at initial enrollment and renewal, but only do such medical 
underwriting in the group market for the smallest of groups.14 
Population characteristics Individual insurance
 (% of group)
Employment-based insurance
(% of group)
Source: Chollet, 2001
Income under 200% FPL (federal poverty level)
Self-employed
Aged 45 to 65
Head of household not in workforce
16.4
25.4
5.2
25.3
26.2
36.4
0.0
10.4
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Where permitted by regulation, insurers may deny coverage to higher-risk individuals, 
accept them at higher premiums, or exclude pre-existing conditions. Recent studies have 
documented the challenge that people with pre-existing medical conditions can face in trying 
to obtain individual insurance (25, 30, 31, 38). Conversely, the lowest-risk applicants, including 
healthy young adults, are often able to find much more affordable individual policies.15
People with individual coverage are more likely to report being in excellent or very 
good health than the rest of the population, and especially compared to people who are 
uninsured or covered by public insurance (Figure 5 and references 5 and 13). This finding 
makes sense considering that insurers in many states can charge higher premiums or refuse to 
write coverage for people with pre-existing health conditions or other high-risk characteristics. 
A multivariate analysis of self-reported health status and the existence of chronic conditions 
by Hadley and Reschovsky16 concludes that the lower purchase rate of individual insurance by 
people with chronic conditions or poor health is due in part to significantly higher premiums 
(43 to 50 percent higher) charged to people with health problems (13).
Figure 5. Health status by type of insurance (nonelderly adults), pooled data 1998–2001
Why did states enact individual insurance market reforms?
Rising health care costs and the desire to make coverage more affordable motivated 
many states to reform individual markets. Increasing health care costs and the downturn in 
the economy in the early 1990s led to a rising uninsured rate. Pressures on state elected officials 
for a solution were often intense. Reforms to insurance underwriting and pricing were a com-
mon response, with the goal of making private insurance more available and affordable. While 
most states made significant changes to the regulation of their small group markets, a more 
modest number took the additional step of also changing their individual insurance laws.17
Health characteristics
Policyholder's health
Excellent, no chronic conditions
Excellent, 1+ chronic conditions
Very good or good, no chronic conditions
Very good or good, 1+ chronic conditions
Very good or good, 2+ chronic conditions
Fair or poor
Individual insurance ESIa Uninsured Publicb
Type of insurance (% of group)
23.6
8.8
28.6
16.4
15.7
6.9
17.7
6.6
30.2
18.0
8.5
9.0
15.3
5.7
28.5
13.6
15.5
21.4
8.9
5.8
20.0
12.9
21.4
31.0
Spouse's healthc
Excellent, very good or good: no chronic conditions
Excellent, very good or good: 1+ chronic conditions
Fair or poor
54.2
39.6
6.2
48.2
42.9
8.9
42.6
35.1
22.3
41.4
35.6
23.0
% % % %
Source: Hadley & Reschovsky, 2003.
aESI = employer-sponsored insurance.
bPrimarily Medicaid, but also includes similar programs funded by state revenues. 
cMarried people only.
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Some states were motivated to reform their individual markets by the financial dete-
rioration of BCBS plans, which served as insurers of last resort (15, 21). In New Jersey, 
for example, a crisis occurred when insurers and businesses challenged the way BCBS losses 
were subsidized as well as other state mechanisms for spreading the costs of uncompensated 
care.18 The Blues—the state’s only insurer accepting high-risk applicants—threatened to with-
draw from the nongroup market if the subsidies paid by other insurers and employers were 
reduced or eliminated. Fearing the loss of insurance for thousands of people, state lawmakers 
responded with comprehensive changes to how the individual market was regulated, includ-
ing a new pay or play reinsurance mechanism requiring insurers selling in the government 
market to also sell in the individual market or pay a share of the losses incurred by insurers 
who were participating (37). Although the reforms did not reduce the overall costs of insuring 
high-risk enrollees, they created a financing arrangement that was more agreeable to the 
state’s major stakeholders, at least for the short term.
Additional state regulation of the individual market was spurred by HIPAA’s (Health Insurance 
Portability and Accessibility Act) requirements that states establish coverage mechanisms 
for people moving from group to individual insurance and that all insurers in the individual 
market write coverage on a guaranteed renewable basis. Although more recent activity has 
occurred in some states—including rollbacks or repeals of provisions enacted in the 1990s—
analyses of these HIPAA-related developments are generally not yet available. 
What are state reforms designed to do?
State reforms of the 1990s ranged from those that placed few restrictions on insurers’ 
underwriting and pricing to more comprehensive reforms that required insurers to 
accept all applicants and charge them the same premiums. Most common were laws 
requiring that individual policies be sold on a guaranteed renewable basis or limiting the use 
of pre-existing condition exclusions and waiting periods. Least common were laws to require 
guaranteed issue, rating bands, and pure community rating (Figure 6). 
Figure 6. Number of states with reform enacted by type and year, 1990–1998, 2000
Year
Guaranteed
issue
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
2000
Guaranteed
renewal
Limits on
pre-existing 
condition exclusions
Modified
community
rating
Pure
community
rating
Rating
bands
0
0
3
6
9
11
13
13
14
12
0
0
4
8
11
17
23
33
42
50
0
2
6
11
14
23
27
29
29
31
0
1
2
3
4
7
8
8
8
6
0
0
2
4
5
6
7
7
9
0
0
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
Sources: Pauly & Allison, 2000; Blue Cross and Blue Shield Assoc., 2001
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Figure 7 illustrates the range of reforms that a state could enact, from the most limited 
to the most comprehensive. Three categories of reforms—underwriting, rating, and risk 
spreading—are shown. Underwriting reforms are designed to make insurance more accessible 
to applicants through such approaches as guaranteed issue and renewal and limiting pre-
existing condition exclusions and waiting periods.
The rating reforms explicitly affect the range of premium variation found in the individual 
market. The reforms to the left of Figure 7 impose no constraints on what the insurer can 
charge an enrollee, resulting in wide variation in premiums based on age, sex, health status, 
and other factors. Premiums for young and healthy enrollees are likely to be relatively inex-
pensive whereas premiums for older and sicker enrollees are likely to be relatively expensive. 
Moving toward the right, the range of premium variation is increasingly constrained. At the 
far right—pure community rating—an insurer must charge all enrollees the same premium for 
the same policy. 
Figure 7. Continuum of state individual insurance reform laws
The underwriting reform laws and the rating reforms closest to the left side of the page 
permit significant segmentation of the individual market because there is minimal pooling of 
risks; the ones farthest to the right require the most pooling of risks. Less pooling and more 
risk segmentation allows the insurer to price its policies at or close to what it anticipates it will 
Underwriting reforms (expand availability)
No issue requirement
Limited open 
enrollment
Guaranteed issue
one plan
Guaranteed issue
all plans
Pre-existing
condition exclusions
No limits on waiting periods
No credit for prior coverage 
Limits on pre-existing
condition exclusions
Limits on waiting periods
Credit for prior coverage 
for a long period
No pre-existing
condition exclusions
Limits on waiting periods
Credit for prior coverage 
for shorter period
Restricted 
availability
Guaranteed
availability
Rating reforms (reduce premium variation)
No rating 
restrictions 
Rate 
bands 
Very tight
rate bands
Modified
community
rating
Pure 
community 
rating
Wide 
variation 
in premiums
No variation
in premiums
Risk spreading mechanisms (encourage insurers to accept high-risks)
Insurer of last resort High-risk pool Risk adjustment
Reinsurance pool
Insurer pay or play
Insurer 
assumes
all risk
Risk is spread
across broad
pool of payers
Source: Fuchs, 2004
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experience in claims and overhead costs for each applicant. But the greater the risk segmenta-
tion, the more likely those individuals or groups falling into the higher-risk pools will be 
priced out of the market. 
Risk spreading mechanisms, the last type of reform shown in Figure 7, affect both the avail-
ability and affordability of health insurance. They range from those that require one insurer 
to serve as an insurer of last resort or safety net insurer—typically in return for favorable tax 
treatment by the state—to high-risk pools, which are subsidized by assessments on insurers (or 
sometimes through broader funding mechanisms such as general revenues). Additional risk 
spreading mechanisms include risk adjustment, reinsurance, and insurer pay or play mecha-
nisms. With these latter risk-spreading mechanisms, the private commercial insurers continue 
to provide coverage directly to insured enrollees but a portion of their costs for high-risk 
enrollees is borne by other insurers or by a broader group of payers (e.g., taxpayers). 
FINDINGS FROM THE RESEARCH LITERATURE
What were the effects of the state individual insurance market reforms?
In this section we assess the findings of the research literature on the following questions: 
• Did the changes in state law make individual insurance more available (i.e., were policies 
available for purchase), especially to people with higher-risk characteristics? Could anyone 
who wanted to buy an individual insurance policy, regardless of health status, prior use of 
health services, or other risk characteristics? 
• How did state insurance reforms affect the cost and affordability of individual insurance? 
What happened to premiums for average, low- and high-risk applicants?
• What were the effects of the state reforms on coverage rates? What were the effects of 
state reforms on the risk characteristics of the population insured? Did the state insurance 
reforms expand coverage rates for high-risk people?
Comparisons are drawn between comprehensive reform states (Figure 8) and those with more 
modest individual market reforms (Iowa, Minnesota and Ohio). A more detailed treatment 
of the research literature is provided in Appendix V (see Tables A. Multivariate Analyses of 
Effects of State Individual Market Reforms on Coverage Rates and Cost of Coverage, and B. 
State-Specific Findings of Synthesis Studies).
Figure 8. Comprehensive reform states*
Kentucky 
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
Vermont
Washington
 
*States with guaranteed issue
  and pure or modified community 
  rating. These states also required 
  guaranteed renewal and limits on 
  pre-existing condition exclusions
  and waiting periods.
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Did the changes in state law make individual insurance more available (i.e., were 
policies available for purchase), especially to people with higher-risk characteristics? 
Could anyone who wanted to buy an individual insurance policy, regardless of 
health status, prior use of health services, or other risk characteristics?
In states that adopted the most comprehensive underwriting reforms—guaranteed 
issue often combined with other reforms such as guaranteed renewability and strict 
limits on exclusions for pre-existing conditions—individual insurance became more 
widely available. That is, policies were available for people to purchase. The case studies 
indicate that access to individual insurance policies for people at high-risk clearly increased 
in the comprehensive reform states of New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Vermont and 
Washington. The effect on availability in the other comprehensive reform states was unclear 
(20, 23).
For states adopting more modest reforms, such as guaranteed renewability and 
restrictions on pre-existing condition exclusions, the implications for expanded 
availability are unclear. Few of the case studies focused on these states, and those that 
did generally failed to tease out the effects of the reforms on availability other than to 
report continued use of exclusion riders and other practices that result in screening out 
high-risk applicants (8). 
Even in states with guaranteed issue and renewal, coverage was not necessarily avail-
able to everyone. Guaranteed issue laws in some states only required carriers to sell one 
policy (and not all policies) to all applicants. In other states, guaranteed issue laws did not in 
practice mean that everyone had to be accepted.19 Guaranteed renewability also could be 
applied restrictively. In some states it was applied only under certain conditions or at much 
higher premiums (17). Finally, in almost every state, insurers were still permitted to require 
waiting periods before they would cover pre-existing conditions, especially for individuals 
who lacked recent prior coverage. 
Comprehensive underwriting reforms generally resulted in carrier departures from 
individual insurance markets and less choice of insurance products. Guaranteed issue is 
thought by many to reduce the availability of insurance options in the individual insurance 
market because many insurers will not sell in states with that requirement. The picture 
emerging from the research on this issue is mixed. In states that enacted both guaranteed 
issue and guaranteed renewability, the choices of insurers tended to decline or remain 
about the same. A significant decline in insurers, however, was more likely in states that 
also imposed community rating or tight rating bands. In Kentucky and Washington, states 
that initially imposed guaranteed issue, community rating, and very tight limits on the use 
of pre-existing condition exclusions, only one or two insurers remained in the market. A 
major exception is New Jersey where the reforms led to a significant increase in the 
number of insurers offering individual coverage, a result attributed to the state’s pay or 
play requirement (37). 
Insurance carrier departures could have been due to other factors. Whether the departure 
of carriers was entirely a response to the new insurance laws or to other factors—such as a 
need to consolidate in order to improve competitive position in other markets—is less clear, 
however. Moreover, in some states, the carriers that left the market accounted for a small 
percentage of individual policy enrollees (6). 
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Guaranteed issue reforms may have promoted faster HMO penetration in individual 
markets. In New York and Massachusetts (15, 20, 21), for example, HMO coverage became 
more widely available and indemnity coverage less available or entirely unavailable. Some 
researchers hypothesize that where permitted by state law, insurers remaining in guaranteed 
issue states—where community rating or rating bands severely limited the allowable variation 
in premiums—made this switch to HMOs intentionally as a subtle means to discourage less 
healthy individuals from choosing their policies. People with chronic conditions or serious 
health conditions tend to prefer indemnity policies because they provide freedom of choice of 
providers. Confirming this hypothesis is difficult, however, because of the more general move-
ment by insurers to managed care during the 1990s in response to health care cost pressures. 
Lo Sasso and Lurie provide some evidence in support of this notion in an unpublished study. 
Controlling for the more general increase in managed care, they found a significant increase 
in HMO penetration in the individual insurance markets of comprehensive reform states 
compared to those without such reforms (22).
The research thus gives us some confidence that guaranteed issue of all policies assures 
the availability (for purchase) of policies to anyone regardless of risk factors, such as 
age or health status. However, the number of insurers selling such coverage may decline, 
especially if guaranteed issue is paired with strict rating restrictions. Moreover, the market is 
more likely to offer more HMO products than in the absence of such regulation.20 Generaliza-
tions about the effects of more modest reforms are less obvious. 
How did state insurance reforms affect the cost and affordability of individual 
insurance? What happened to premiums for average, low- and high-risk applicants?
Many analysts predicted that when states adopted guaranteed issue and pure community 
rating, premiums in the individual market would increase for low-risk enrollees and decrease 
for high-risk enrollees. Because a few high-risk enrollees account for the vast amount of 
spending, average premiums would increase. If premiums for low-risk enrollees increased 
significantly, an adverse selection spiral could result. 
Average premiums did generally increase in states with community rating although 
the evidence is largely qualitative and not quantitative. In states that adopted rate bands 
(which allow greater premium variation based on risk factors), the literature mostly fails to 
find significant effects on average premiums. 
Swartz and Garnick found that average premiums declined for the first two years after reforms 
were enacted in New Jersey, but then increased. As expected, premiums also went down for 
high-risk individuals, and up for low-risk enrollees who had previously been buying coverage 
though the one-person group market and now could only get their coverage through the 
individual market (37). However, an adverse selection spiral did not occur, perhaps in part 
because people who could afford to purchase the post-reform individual policies were, on 
average, healthier than those who did not choose to enroll, “probably because the latter 
could not afford insurance” (35). 
Hall found that, in New York, individual premiums increased overall for comprehensive 
indemnity policies and somewhat more moderately for managed care policies (15). Not 
detailed, however, was how premiums may have changed for below-average and above-
average risk enrollees. In Vermont, Hall found higher average premiums, and no evidence of 
an adverse selection spiral, perhaps averted because community rating was phased in and the 
Blues had already been using community rating. In addition, the Blues had agreed to serve as 
a “safety net,” offering to continue coverage to anyone whose insurer left the market. This 
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measure initially helped reduce the rate increases that these people would otherwise have 
experienced, encouraging them to remain insured (16). In Washington, average premiums also 
increased, but evidence on how premiums varied by risk characteristics was not provided (21). 
Where rating restrictions were phased in, average premium increases tended to be more 
moderate than in states where community rating or very restrictive rating bands were 
implemented all at once. This finding is suggested by the more general reviews of state 
insurance reforms (8). Such studies also observe that in states that allowed insurers to use pre-
existing condition exclusions or that required insurers selling in the group market to also sell 
in the individual insurance market (a form of risk-spreading, see below for discussion), there 
was less likelihood of an adverse selection spiral.
Use of risk-spreading mechanisms also helped avert adverse selection. In states providing 
mechanisms that either spread risk among insurers selling individual insurance (such as risk 
adjustment or reinsurance) or spread the risk across a wider set of payers (such as taxpayers), 
severe adverse selection was less likely than in those community rating and guaranteed issue 
states that failed to adopt such mechanisms. New Jersey’s post-reform pay or play mechanism 
and New York’s risk adjustment mechanism appear to have helped moderate the rise in 
premiums, at least over the short run, preventing the selection spiral that some reform critics 
predicted (15, 36). 
In summary, community rating resulted in higher premiums on average, lower premiums 
for higher-risk individuals, and higher premiums for lower-risk enrollees. More modest 
reforms, such as rating bands, had no clear effect on average premiums or on the premiums 
paid by higher or lower-risk enrollees. If the goal of community rating was to spread the costs 
of the sick across a wider pool of insured persons, then they succeeded, at least over the short 
run. But by reducing the cost of individual insurance for those most in need while raising it for 
lower-cost enrollees, they discouraged younger and healthier people from buying individual 
insurance, a result that becomes more evident in addressing the next question. 
What were the effects of the state reforms on coverage rates?
Using Current Population Survey data from the U.S. Census Bureau, many of the studies were 
able to determine whether total state insurance coverage increased or decreased after the 
reforms were enacted. Few such studies, however, were able to conclude with any statistical 
certainty that the reforms—as opposed to other factors such as changes in Medicaid or the 
economy—were responsible for the changes in coverage rates. The evidence on the effects 
of state individual market reforms on the risk characteristics of the pool of insured was even 
more tentative. 
States with more comprehensive reforms experienced a decrease in overall coverage 
rates, thus failing to achieve a common reform goal. However, the studies supporting 
these conclusions have a variety of methodological shortcomings. Common limitations are the 
grouping of different state reforms together that, in fact, are quite different and examining 
the effects of the reforms over too brief a period of time. The full effects of reforms may not 
be realized in three or four years, the timeframe for most of these studies. Additional short-
comings are discussed in Appendix II. That said, with one exception, the studies are consistent 
in the direction of their findings—total coverage declined—but not in the strength or size 
of their findings. States that enacted less comprehensive reforms experienced modest or no 
changes in coverage. 
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Zuckerman and Rajan found that, controlling for other factors, a combination of reforms 
including guaranteed issue, guaranteed renewal, rating restrictions and pre-existing condition 
exclusion restrictions were related to lower coverage rates, with the decline coming in private 
insurance coverage rates (both individual and group coverage). In addition, guaranteed issue 
considered in isolation of the other reforms was found to decrease coverage rates, although 
a finding of no change in private coverage makes this finding suspect. More limited reforms 
were found to produce a reduction in private coverage but not in overall state coverage rates 
(41). Similarly, Sloan and Conover found that the likelihood of being insured declined in states 
that required community rating (34). Marsteller and her colleagues found that guaranteed 
issue together with premium rating restrictions worked together to decrease private coverage 
as well as overall coverage rates (24). On the other hand, Buchmueller and DiNardo, looking 
at how coverage rates changed in a comprehensive reform state, New York, compared with 
two states that did not enact such reforms, Pennsylvania and Connecticut, found that New 
York’s community rating law was not responsible for changing the rate of coverage but was 
responsible for changing the nature of individual insurance from largely indemnity to HMO 
coverage (2). 
Several of the case studies also examined the effects of insurance market reforms on coverage 
rates but provided more qualitative and cautious assessments of whether changes were likely 
due to state insurance reforms, other factors, or a combination. In some states—Massachusetts 
and Minnesota, for example—concurrent changes in the laws governing small group insurers 
may have led to shifting from individual to group policies, but resulted in no changes in over-
all coverage rates.21 In other states, factors unrelated to the reforms—changes in unemploy-
ment, for example—may have been the cause of changes in coverage rates.
Some states adopted high-risk pools in lieu of other underwriting reforms such as guaranteed 
issue or annual open enrollment. Although the descriptive literature on state high-risk pools is 
rich, few studies have attempted to measure whether the presence of a high-risk pool in a state 
increases the probability of being insured. One study done for the Health Insurance Association 
of America concluded that the presence of a state high-risk pool results in a slight increase in 
the likelihood of being insured (10). But two studies produced by independent analysts 
concluded that the presence of a state high-risk pool had no effect on coverage rates (3, 24). 
What were the effects of state reforms on the risk characteristics of the 
population insured? 
After reforms in New York and New Jersey, average age increased, but the health 
status of enrollees did not necessarily change. In New York, the risk pool changed—claims 
and average age increased—after guaranteed issue and renewability reforms, although the 
finding is based on incomplete data from insurers and interviews of stakeholders (15). In New 
Jersey, the evidence suggests a more complicated picture: one in which age increased but the 
health status of enrollees remained relatively good. Swartz and Garnick compared the self-
reported health status, age and other risk characteristics of enrollees in individual policies 
compared with the state’s uninsured and employer-covered populations after the New 
Jersey reforms were implemented. They found that enrollees with individual coverage were 
more likely to be older and female than the uninsured but also more likely to be healthier. 
Concerned that income differences could be confounding the analysis—because many low-
income people were assumed to be unable to afford individual policy premiums—the analysts 
then controlled for income. The risk pool of individually insured people then looked the same 
as those who were uninsured and those who were covered by employer-sponsored insurance. 
The researchers concluded that the state’s insurance reforms did make it possible for more 
high-risk people to obtain individual coverage. However, only those with higher incomes 
were doing so and they tended to be, on average, healthier than those who did not enroll, 
probably because many who did not could not afford insurance. The researchers speculated 
that adverse selection in New Jersey’s individual market might worsen over time. Moreover, 
the risk pool would probably deteriorate if safety net services for the uninsured (e.g., free 
clinics) became scarcer. Then more high-risk uninsured would need individual coverage to get 
health care. (35) 
Did the state insurance reforms expand coverage rates for high-risk people? 
Few studies directly examine this question, but one study concludes that reforms 
increased the coverage rate for the unhealthy, but decreased it for the healthy. Lo 
Sasso and Lurie offer potentially generalizable but preliminary results in their unpublished 
analysis of data from the Bureau of the Census’ Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP).22 Comparing data for states with these reforms versus those without them, the authors 
concluded that community rating “made healthy people less likely to be insured by nongroup 
policies and unhealthy people more likely to be insured by nongroup policies. At the same 
time, the healthy were more likely to be uninsured and the unhealthy were less likely to 
be uninsured.” Their findings also indicate that enrollees in individual policies in community 
rating states “as a group, were sicker as a result of the community rating laws” (22). 
While the overall coverage rate may decline, reforms such as community rating coupled 
with guaranteed issue can improve the likelihood that higher-risk people will buy 
individual policies. However, they do not result in premiums that are necessarily low 
enough to be affordable for low-income people, who make up a sizable portion of any 
state’s uninsured population.
Most of the evidence suggests that in those states electing to implement guaranteed issue 
and community rating, enrollees in the individual insurance market are, on average, older 
and sicker than in other states. However, this is an area where the findings are mixed and the 
research is in need of better data. 
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Health insurance tax credits play a central role in many proposals to expand coverage to the 
uninsured. Some proponents believe that the credits themselves will be sufficient to stimulate 
the types of changes in the insurance market necessary to achieve significant reductions in the 
uninsured. Others believe that tax credits should be accompanied by changes in the regula-
tion of the insurance market, including reforms to the rating and underwriting of individual 
policies. From either perspective, lessons can be learned from states’ reform efforts of the 
1990s. Perhaps the most important lesson is that efforts to reform the individual market can 
sometimes produce unexpected and unintended consequences. 
The research reviewed for this synthesis permits tentative conclusions about the effects of 
state insurance reforms on availability and cost of individual coverage and offers a few 
specific lessons. Availability for high-risk persons expanded, at least in the few states that 
adopted both guaranteed issue and community rating. But the gains in access to coverage 
for high-risk people were modest at best, most likely because these reforms did not bring 
down the cost of insurance low enough to attract large numbers of uninsured. Where states 
adopted guaranteed issue and community rating but did not provide for risk spreading 
mechanisms, such as reinsurance pools, the proportion of younger and healthier individual 
policyholders declined (i.e., adverse selection occurred). The coverage rate either remained 
unchanged or decreased. More modest state reforms, such as annual open enrollment, rate 
bands, and high-risk pools, produced weak or no statistically significant effects on rates of 
coverage. The few specific state case studies suggest that they at least did no harm, and may 
have increased the number of insurance options available to high-risk individuals. 
In all, if policy-makers rely on the types of state reforms that were enacted in the 1990s to 
make the individual insurance market a realistic option for people of low and modest incomes, 
they may be disappointed. It may even be the case that for the younger and healthier 
uninsured, a largely unregulated insurance market (with respect to rating and underwriting 
practices) is more likely than a regulated market to offer inexpensive policies. In such a market, 
however, people of modest incomes who happen to be older, have a pre-existing medical 
condition, or have some other characteristic identifying them as high-risk, are unlikely to be 
able to obtain individual insurance. 
Some people argue that the individual insurance market would become a more viable market 
if tax credits were made available to help lower-income uninsured people gain access to it 
(19). According to this argument, the credits would lower the effective premiums of individual 
insurance, making it more affordable. Moreover, if tax credits were made available, many 
people, including many healthy people who might otherwise remain uninsured, would seek 
individual coverage. As more healthy people entered this market, say these analysts, insurers 
would gradually grow less concerned about adverse selection and would accept more appli-
cants with less restrictive underwriting. With this increased quantity and stability of demand 
for individual policies, insurers might price such policies low enough to be affordable for 
tax-credit recipients. In other words, insurers would follow the money, especially if there were 
few regulations to restrict their rating and underwriting practices.
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The brief experience with the health insurance component of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC-HI) (enacted in 1990 and repealed in 1993) suggests that the market will indeed produce 
policies to respond to tax credit amounts. But as was the case with the EITC-HI, the policies 
that emerge are likely to offer limited benefits or significant enrollee cost sharing. Such 
policies may not be adequate for the population most in need of insurance (39, 40). 
For tax credits to achieve significant reductions in the uninsured, they may need to be 
combined with comprehensive market reforms or other measures to assure access to health 
insurance for credit-eligible people. While the individual market reforms of the 1990s had only 
a modest impact on coverage rates of higher-risk people, it is possible that similar reforms, if 
combined with substantial subsidies (through tax credits), would have a greater impact.
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A number of issues are suggested for additional investigation and study. Anticipating further 
discussions of tax credits, the most important question is what premiums the uninsured might 
face in the individual insurance market and how such premiums would vary by age, health 
status, and state of residence.23 In addition, to what extent are state high-risk pools a viable 
alternative to the conventional individual insurance market for high-risk and other individuals? 
Although an extensive descriptive literature on state high-risk pools exists, providing 
information on the prices, benefits, and financing of their policies, little analysis exists 
to judge their effectiveness in expanding coverage. 
Looking backward to the state reforms of the 1990s, additional questions include:
• How did the state reforms of the 1990s affect the adequacy of coverage, including exposure 
to out-of-pocket costs, exclusions for the treatment of specific conditions or diseases, etc.? 
Did states requiring standardized benefit packages experience different results from those 
that allowed benefit flexibility? How did state individual market reforms affect the choice of 
policies available in the individual market?
• How did small group and individual market reforms interact? 
• How does the individual market work in those states that enacted no reforms or the least 
comprehensive reforms?
• Now with six or seven years’ experience, what effect did HIPAA and state conforming laws 
have on the availability and affordability of individual coverage? On coverage rates? Did the 
effects of HIPAA (intended or unintended) persist over time or did they change?
The Need for Additional Information
 1. The centerpiece of President Bush’s proposal to expand health insurance is a refundable tax credit that would 
give eligible uninsured individuals a credit scaled to income to pay for a percentage of the insurance premium 
up to a specific amount ($1,000/$3,000 in the first year, then indexed for inflation). Other Congressional 
proposals call for different credit amounts but are structured similarly. Still other Congressional proposals 
would expand upon the Trade Adjustment Act of 2002, which provides refundable tax credits to certain 
workers who lost employer-sponsored health benefits as a result of U.S. trade agreements.
 2. The numbers in parentheses refer to reference articles from Appendix I.
 3. Only a subset of these studies appear in peer-reviewed publications. A decision was made to include an article 
if it was sufficiently explicit about its methodology to assess the validity and reliability of its conclusions. 
 4. The percentage of the nonelderly population covered by individual health insurance policies was about 7 
percent in 1989, rising to a high of 7.7 percent in 1993, and declining pretty steadily thereafter to 6.7 percent 
in 2002. See reference no. 11 (Figure 1, p. 5) in Appendix I.
 5. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) established federal minimum 
requirements related to group-to-individual portability and guaranteed renewability of individual insurance 
products. Otherwise, individual insurance is governed by the laws of the state in which it is sold, or if sold in 
the nation’s capital, by the District of Columbia. 
 6. However, during the early to mid-1990s, which is the focus of this research synthesis, the HMO share of the 
individual market increased relative to traditional indemnity insurance in many states.
 7. See reference no. 4 (p. 5) in Appendix I. Note that in some states, individuals without a group source of 
coverage may obtain insurance through association health plans, formed by local chambers of commerce, 
trade associations, or other groups to achieve administrative economies and potential premium savings. 
Enrollment data for association plans are generally unavailable. These plans are often subject to different 
insurance laws and regulations than individual insurers but nevertheless are a source of coverage for a 
significant number of people in some states. See reference nos. 1 and 21 in Appendix I. 
 8. These are simulated and not real premiums, based on a statistical model using data from two waves (1998–
1999 and 2000–2001) of a nationally representative survey. Included in the model are variables to measure the 
effects of health, age, and family structure on premiums. See reference no. 13 in Appendix I.
 9. This provision requires that a state have a mechanism by which a person moving from continuous group 
coverage to individual insurance can buy insurance that does not have any pre-existing condition exclusion 
waiting period.
10. This law provides refundable tax credits to subsidize 65 percent of the insurance premiums for some individuals 
who have lost job-related health insurance due to trade agreements or the termination of their retiree health 
plan and payments of pension benefits through the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. A state may elect 
from several options to use for insurance coverage that is qualified for the premium subsidy, one of which is a 
state high-risk pool. This legislation also established a small grant program to the states to help encourage the 
establishment of high-risk pools or to help finance existing pools. 
11. Because the premiums collected from high-risk pool enrollees are insufficient to cover their claims, states rely 
on a variety of mechanisms, such as assessments on individual insurers, to supplement the premiums. 
12. For example, the monthly premium for the least expensive Minnesota risk pool policy option ($2,000 
deductible) for a family of four (two adults between 30 and 34 years old and two children) was $513 in 2003. 
A family at 200 percent of the federal poverty level would have to pay almost 17 percent of its income to pay 
for this policy. 
13. Chollet’s analysis of the March 1998 Current Population Survey found that about one-third of people with 
individual insurance also reported having employer coverage. See reference no. 7 in Appendix I.
14. Many insurers impose medical underwriting for employers with 10 or fewer employees; some insurers do it for 
groups of up to 25 or 50. Group insurers also assess the overall insurability of the group on the basis of the 
prior year’s claims experience. This assessment is used to determine what the insurer will charge in premiums 
for that group’s coverage if the insurance is experience-rated. 
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15. Some people who may be able to afford individual coverage may not seek it because they think it will be too 
expensive, when, in fact, low-cost policies are available. See reference no. 27 in Appendix I. 
16. Although insurers have claims and other data to assess the risk of applicants and enrollees, researchers usually 
have to rely on national surveys of self-reported health status to assess the risk of people with individual 
coverage. 
17. A few states adopted at first even more sweeping reforms to contain costs as well as expand health insurance 
coverage, such as employer mandates and universal coverage requirements, but for a variety of reasons, later 
scaled them back. For example, Washington State enacted community rating and a cap on private insurance 
premiums as part of larger reforms in 1993 but scaled them back shortly thereafter, in part, because insurers 
had either exited the market or stayed but incurred significant financial losses. See reference no. 33 in 
Appendix I. 
18. Under New Jersey law, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plan served as the insurer of last resort, meaning that 
it took applicants that no other insurer would accept. In return, a portion of its underwriting losses (claims 
paid in excess of premiums collected) was covered by assessments on other insurers. See reference no. 37 in 
Appendix I. 
19. For example, people in Iowa who would otherwise have had only high-risk pool coverage as an option could 
now find policies in the conventional individual insurance market. However, to qualify for guaranteed issue, 
they had to have had prior coverage (group, individual, or high-risk pool) for a year or a qualifying event 
within the previous 30 days. See reference no. 18 in Appendix I. 
20. Projecting these lessons to the current insurance market, where preferred provider organizations (PPOs) have 
become more prevalent than HMOs and indemnity coverage represents a small fraction of the market, it is 
likely that insurers would respond to guaranteed issue and rating restrictions by designing their policies to 
include higher cost-sharing, including higher coinsurance for out-of-network providers. This could be seen 
as a means to manage the health care needs of high-cost individuals and moderate the rise in premiums. 
Alternatively, it may be viewed as a means to discourage enrollment of less healthy individuals. 
21. The most likely small group reform to produce this effect changed the minimum threshold for a small group 
from two employees to one employee.
22. These researchers used self-reported health status as proxy data for claims to assess the effects of pure and 
modified community rating requirements (and guaranteed issue) on the age and health status of enrollees in 
individual insurance.
23. A good start towards answering this question can be found in reference no. 13 in Appendix I.
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Case studies help us understand the complexities of insurance reforms and how they affect state 
insurance markets but they do not allow for generalizations across states. What was true for New York 
was true for New York. Some of the case studies examined for this synthesis also failed to distinguish 
at crucial junctures whether the discussion related to a state’s individual market or small group market 
reforms.
The quantitative literature presented a number of challenges, reinforcing a common sense view 
that determining cause and effect or even statistical associations with any confidence in such a 
complex arena as state insurance reforms is a high-risk enterprise. Because multiple state reforms 
often were implemented simultaneously and other changes independent of insurance reforms were 
also occurring concurrently,1 a general problem of endogenous and confounding variables limits the 
explanatory confidence of the multivariate analyses. In addition, achieving a fully-specified model is 
problematic since many of the variables affecting the individual market may be difficult or impossible 
to quantify. More specifically, many of the studies of the individual market, and most especially those 
using multivariate analysis, are weakened by one or more of the following methodological problems:
• Underspecification of the models: Variables that play an important role in explaining rates of 
coverage in a state are not adequately captured in the models. The response by insurance agents 
and brokers to changing regulations is often studied but difficult to measure and important control 
variables may not be included. Coverage rates may have more to do with economic conditions 
(e.g., unemployment or changes from an industrial to a service-sector based economy) or transfor-
mations of the health care market (e.g., managed care penetration and increased self-insurance) 
than regulatory changes. 
• Oversimplified specification of models by using dummy variables. The use of binary variables for 
specific reforms does not adequately capture the range of variation that exists. For example, 
studies often considered rating reforms as either present or not when, in fact, the effects of 
varying degrees of premium restrictions imposed by rating bands are likely to be different. 
• Inaccurate or incomplete data on the state laws and regulations: Some of the studies rely on one 
source, of a summary nature, to reflect the different state reforms. But this source is not consis-
tently accurate and does not reflect subtle differences that may be critical in explaining coverage 
effects. Moreover, lack of data on association health plans, discretionary groups, and purchasing 
groups in all states means that the analyses cannot tell the whole story.
• Inadequate and noncomparable state-specific data on sources of coverage, premiums and benefit 
packages prior to reform renders it difficult to do pre- and post-reform analyses. The most basic 
information on pre-reform enrollment and premiums tends to be sketchy at best. 
• State laws were not in effect long enough for effects to be reflected in the variables used in the 
models. Some of the studies rely on very few observations of regulatory change during a study 
period. A change in one or two states could drive all of the measurable effects.
1 These include changing economic and employment conditions affecting the availability of employer-sponsored coverage, 
expansions in Medicaid eligibility, the increased competition from managed care organizations and the decline in indemnity 
insurance, and the acquisition and merger of many insurance companies leading to increased market concentration.
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Adverse selection—Adverse selection is the phenomenon by which people who anticipate high 
medical care costs will be the most likely to purchase health insurance. Insurers are wary of adverse 
selection because it causes them to underestimate premium revenues needed to pay claims and 
thus results in financial losses. To avoid or reduce adverse selection, insurers will often adopt selec-
tion (underwriting) practices designed to screen out applicants who they expect will be high users 
of medical services. 
Adverse selection spiral—An adverse selection spiral can result when an insurer raises premiums 
to reflect an increase in the pool’s average claims experience. If the insurer raises the premium to 
everyone in the pool that includes people with a range of risks, low-risk enrollees will drop the 
plan, leaving a smaller pool of enrollees with higher average health care costs. This sequence, 
a rate increase followed by worsening average experience necessitating another rate increase, 
is called an adverse selection spiral. Insurance pools in an adverse selection spiral will usually 
eventually fail and then be pulled from the market. 
Association plans—Association plans are insurance plans sponsored by a trade or professional 
association, chamber of commerce or other type of group.
Blocks of business—Insurers traditionally categorize their products in blocks or books of business, 
according to the basic type of policy and the manner in which it is marketed. For example, a health 
insurer might maintain separate blocks of business for its individual policies, its small-group policies, 
and insurance sold to trade associations. 
Community rating—Community rating is a requirement that all policyholders of an insurer be 
charged the same premium for the same coverage (note that different insurers will have different 
community rates). Under pure community rating, an insurer can vary the premium based only upon 
where the enrollee lives (geographic location), specific benefit package selected, and the family size 
(or total number of people covered under a family policy). 
Adjusted/modified community rating—Unlike pure community rating, adjusted/modified com-
munity rating allows an insurer to vary premiums for coverage based on specified demographic 
characteristics (age, gender, location) but not to vary premiums based on the health status or 
claims history of policyholders. 
Guaranteed issue—Guaranteed issue is a requirement that insurers accept applicants when they 
apply initially for a policy generally without regard to their health status or previous claims 
experience. Separate provisions of law may or may not regulate the premiums that the insurer 
charges. State law may require that all individual policies be sold as guaranteed issue, or as is 
more common, that a carrier offer one or two guaranteed issue products. Some states only require 
carriers to accept all applicants during a specified and usually limited open enrollment period. 
Guaranteed renewability—Guaranteed renewability is a provision of an insurance policy or law that 
prohibits an insurer from canceling an enrollee’s policy at renewal for reasons other than failure to 
pay premiums or fraud. The health insurer generally is permitted to change the premium rates at 
renewal. A carrier may choose not to renew all of its individual policies by exiting a state’s market 
but the insurer is usually then prohibited from reentering the market for at least some number of 
years. 
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Insurer Pay or Play—As used in this document, insurer pay or play refers to the type of risk spreading 
mechanism established under New Jersey’s reforms. It required all insurers selling health insurance 
coverage in the state to either actively sell individual policies in compliance with the state laws or 
pay a share of the losses incurred by those insurers that sell individual policies and seek reimburse-
ment of their losses.
Medical underwriting—In the absence of state restrictions, carriers evaluate the health status of 
an applicant to determine whether an applicant’s health status should result in an increase to the 
standard premium, the exclusion of a body part or system (e.g., circulatory system), the exclusion of 
an existing health condition, or the denial of the applicant altogether. This process is called medical 
underwriting. 
Open enrollment—Open enrollment is a certain period of time during which an individual can enroll 
in an insurance plan and the insurer must allow all eligible beneficiaries to join. 
Pre-existing condition exclusion—A pre-existing condition exclusion is a provision of an insurance 
contract that specifies the length of time that coverage can be denied for previously diagnosed 
problems. These exclusions are typically for a certain length of time (e.g., six or 12 months), for 
conditions diagnosed a certain number of months (e.g., three, six or 12 months) prior to the date 
the policy becomes effective. Sometimes, exclusions can be permanent and can be applied to body 
parts or body systems (e.g., circulatory or respiratory system).
Rating bands—Rating bands are laws that restrict the difference between the lowest and highest 
premium that an insurer may charge for the same coverage. A law may specify, for example, that 
the highest rate an insurer may charge for a policy may not be more than 150 percent of the 
lowest rate charged for the same policy. The law may limit all factors by which rates vary, or may 
apply only to specified factors, such as health status, claims experience, age, or gender. In this 
synthesis, “restrictive rating bands” are those that permit the least variation for risk factors and 
come closest to community rating. 
Reinsurance—Used in this context, reinsurance is a mechanism by which insurers can pass on high-
risk individuals to a centralized pool of insurers. It provides incentives to insurers to cover applicants 
who are perceived to be bad risks. Note that the term is also used to describe the transfer of risk 
from one insurer to another. Insurers will often buy reinsurance in the private market to protect 
themselves from the losses resulting from catastrophic claims. 
Risk adjustment—Under an administered risk adjustment system, payments are increased to an 
insurer for above-average risk enrollees and lowered for below-average risk enrollees. 
Underwriting—Underwriting is the process of identifying and classifying the risk represented by an 
individual or group.
The definitions in this glossary are based on several of the synthesis studies as well as the following: Claxton, Gary, 
How Private Insurance Works: A Primer, Kaiser Family Foundation, April 2002, www.kff.org; Hall, Mark A. Reforming 
Private Health Insurance. Washington, AEI Press, 1994; U.S. General Accounting Office, Private Health Insurance. 
Millions Relying on Individual Market Face Cost and Coverage Trade-Offs. GAO/HEHS-97–8, November 1996.
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Sources of health insurance coverage among the nonelderly population, by selected characteristics of the insured individual: 1997
Population characteristics
Total 
population
under age 65 
(millions)
Employment-based insurance Individual insurance Uninsured
Percent of 
population
Percent of 
employer-
insured 
population
Percent of 
population
Percent of 
individually 
insured 
population
Percent of 
population
Percent of 
uninsured
Age:
Less than 18
      18–24
      25–44
      45–54
      55–64
70.8
24.9
82.8
34.0
22.2
63.7
56.8
69.4
74.3
65.7
28.8
9.1
36.3
16.2
10.0
5.1
6.0
5.9
8.2
13.0
22.9
9.5
31.1
17.9
18.5
15.0
30.2
20.0
13.8
14.1
25.0
17.6
38.9
11.0
7.4
Family income as a % of 
federal poverty level:
      0–99 percent
      100–199 percent
      200–299 percent
      300–399 percent
      400 percent +
32.7
41.1
41.1
35.7
84.2
 18.2
47.7
71.2
81.5
86.2
        
3.8
12.6
18.7
18.6
46.4
4.1
6.3
7.2
7.1
7.3
8.7
16.7
18.9
16.2
39.6
34.4
32.1
18.8
11.3
7.6
26.4
31.0
18.1
9.5
15.1
Work status of family head:
     Full-time full-year worker
     Part-time or part-year worker
     Nonworker
167.7
44.4
23.2
78.5
46.5
20.1
83.8
12.9
0.0
                         
6.0
8.9
7.0
64.2
25.4
10.4
14.2
28.5
26.4
55.9
29.7
14.4
Type of employment 
of family head:
     Wage or salary worker
     Self-employed incorporated
     Self-employed unincorporated
     Unpaid workers or nonworker
194.8
8.3
8.3
23.3
73.7
69.6
29.0
20.1
91.8
3.7
1.5
3.0
5.1
18.4
29.2
7.1
64.2
9.8
15.5
10.5
16.6
12.8
35.8
26.4
76.1
2.5
7.0
14.4
Source: Deborah Chollet , Assessing the Individual Health Insurance market in the Post-HIPAA Era: A Review of the Literature,  Department of Health and Human Services, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, June 2001, p. 6. 
Totals do not add to 100% due to exclusion of the counts for public coverage.
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Table A. Multivariate analyses of effects of state individual market reforms on coverage rates and cost of coverage
Study Description Cost of coverage  Coverage rates
Other findings/
comments
Buchmueller 
and DiNardo
Using CPS in 3 states (1986–1995), analyzed 
effects of NY’s community rating laws on 
rate of group health insurance coverage and 
the prevalence of HMO versus indemnity 
coverage as compared with Connecticut and 
Pennsylvania which did not enact such reforms 
(i.e. control states). 
Not analyzed. No change as a result of community rating. 
Decline due to other factors. (Market changed 
to more managed care relative to Pennsylvania 
and Connecticut.)
Chollet, Simon 
and Kirk
Using CPS for 1996–1998, analyzed effects 
of individual and group market regulation on 
coverage of adults. 
Not analyzed. Guaranteed issue of all products decreased 
probability of coverage by nine percentage 
points, controlling for all other factors. Rating 
bands and limits on pre-existing condition 
exclusions had no significant effect on coverage 
of individuals without employer or public 
coverage. High-risk pools also had no effect on 
coverage.
Paper for HHS/ASPE 
—not peer reviewed.
Custer Using CPS 1998 (for coverage for 1997), 
analyzed effects of rating bands, community 
rating, and guaranteed issue on the probability 
of being uninsured. 
Not analyzed. Community rating and guaranteed-issue 
requirements increased the likelihood of being 
uninsured by 11.3 percent; rating bands and 
guaranteed issue increased the likelihood of 
being uninsured by 5.1 percent. A state high-
risk pool decreased the likelihood of being 
uninsured by 1.5 percent.
Sponsored by advocacy 
organization and details 
of methodology not 
provided.
Lo Sasso and Lurie Using the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) for 1990–2000 and the 
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) for 
1993 and 1994, analyzed effects of community 
rating on the composition of risk-pool and the 
penetration of HMO coverage in the individual 
market. (Used non-community-rating states as 
control states.) 
Not analyzed. 
(Used age and 
health status as 
proxy for cost of 
coverage.)
Community rating decreased probability of 
healthy men (aged 22–35 with excellent 
or very good self-described health status) 
having individual coverage by as much as 
54 percent and increased probability of 
unhealthy people (40 and over, no children, 
and poor self-described health status) having 
individual coverage by as much as 50 percent. 
Community rating produced a 21 percent 
increase in uninsured rate of healthy and 50 
percent decrease in uninsured rate of unhealthy. 
Community rating increased HMO penetration 
rate in individual market by about 5.4 percent.
Unpublished study 
(newly completed 
November 2003); 
not peer reviewed; 
available from authors.
Marsteller, et al. Using CPS from 1989–1995, analyzed effects 
of state reforms on rates of uninsured rates, 
private coverage, and Medicaid for nonelderly.
Not analyzed. Guaranteed issue plus nongroup premium 
rating restrictions together work to decrease 
overall and private coverage. High-risk pools 
showed no effect on coverage once California 
was removed from model. 
Schriver and Arnett Using CPS from 1989–1996, analyzed effect 
of individual market reforms on rates of 
uninsured, private market insurance, and 
individual insurance market coverage in 16 
states compared with coverage rates in non-
reform states (for nonelderly). 
Some of the 
separate mini case 
studies included in 
this paper provide 
anecdotal data 
on changes in 
premiums after 
reforms enacted.
The uninsured rate grew faster or declined 
less in reform states between 1990 and 1996. 
Individual coverage declined faster in reform 
states than in states without reforms. 
Analysis does not 
include control 
variables or tests of 
significance.
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Study Description Cost of coverage  Coverage rates
Other findings/
comments
Sloan and Conover Using 1989–1995 data, analyzed effects of 
small group and individual insurance reforms, 
Medicaid expansions, and benefit mandates 
on probabilities of having insurance, having 
private insurance, and having employer group 
insurance among nonelderly for 1989–1994. 
Not analyzed. Community rating of enrollees decreased the 
probability of having any insurance with an 
effect nearly significant at five percent level. 
Limit on individual pre-existing exclusion limits 
increased likelihood of any (public or private) 
coverage. Other variables (guaranteed issue, 
guaranteed renewal, limits on pre-existing 
condition exclusions) had no statistical effect.
No evidence of 
disenrollment resulting 
from state reforms.
Swartz and 
Garnick, 1999
Tested for adverse selection in the New 
Jersey individual insurance market after the 
reforms were implemented by comparing 
self-reported health status, age, and other risk 
characteristics of enrollees in those policies 
during 1995–1996 with two control groups: NJ 
adults without insurance and NJ adults with 
employer group insurance (using 1996 CPS). 
Not analyzed. Not analyzed. People in individual 
insurance plans less 
likely than uninsured 
to be in fair or poor 
health, but more likely 
to be older and female. 
Removing low-income 
from analysis (since 
they would not be able 
to afford individual 
policies), health status, 
age, and sex differences 
disappear.
Enrollees in individual 
policies are more likely 
to be older and female 
than group enrollees 
but have same health 
status. Differences 
disappear when lower-
income excluded. 
Zuckerman
and Rajan
Using 1990–1996 CPS, examined the effects of 
specific state insurance reforms and packages 
of reforms on the rates of coverage and on 
the rate of private coverage for 1989–1995. 
Dependent variables: percent of state’s 
nonelderly population that is uninsured, 
privately insured, Medicaid.
 Not analyzed. Broadest package of reforms (all four: 
guaranteed issue, guaranteed availability, 
rating restrictions, and pre-existing condition 
exclusion restrictions) related to higher 
uninsured rates with the decline coming in 
private coverage rates. 
Private coverage declined as a result of more 
limited package of reforms. When analyzed 
as individual variables, guaranteed issue 
decreased coverage overall, but had no 
effect on private insurance coverage rate. 
“An average state that adopts the full set of 
individual reforms could see its uninsured rates 
increase from the national average of 
15 percent to 17.4 percent.”
“Privately insured” 
does not differentiate 
between individual and 
group coverage.
Argues for analyzing 
packages of reforms 
and not individual 
reforms due to 
multicollinearity 
problem.
Table A. Multivariate analyses of effects of state individual market reforms on coverage rates and cost of coverage (continued)
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Table B. State-specific findings of synthesis studies1
State and 
years 
analyzed Study Key reforms
Rate of insurance 
coverage (overall and in 
individual market)
Average 
premium
Availability and 
market stability 
(for high-risk individuals)
Iowa
1996 and 
1997 laws
Hall, 1999
Chollet and 
Kirk, 1998
In general, rating bands apply among (not within) 
blocks of business (see glossary for definition 
of “blocks of business”) and can vary for 
demographics, health status, claims experience and 
duration of coverage. Guaranteed issue of basic 
and standard plan for people moving from group 
to nongroup coverage with no variation for health 
status within block; limit on pre-existing condition 
exclusions (12 months/12 months), and mandatory 
risk adjustment for guaranteed issue basic and 
standard plans. (Nonguaranteed issue applicants 
can obtain coverage through high-risk pool.)
Unclear.
(CPS indicates decline but 
limited by small sample size 
and only one year of post-
reform data.)
Higher average 
premiums for 
guaranteed issue 
policies; no apparent 
change in premiums 
for non-guaranteed 
issue products. 
Increased availability of 
options for those purchasing 
guaranteed issue policies 
(would have otherwise used 
high-risk pool).
Number of insurers: stable. 
Kentucky
1994, 1996, 
and 1998 laws 
(analyzed 
through 1999)
Kirk, 2000 1994: All products guaranteed issue, tight 
rating bands (not based on health status, claims 
experience, or gender); prior rate approval; 
standardized benefits; six-month pre-existing 
condition exclusion; purchasing alliance through 
which individuals could buy coverage.
1996: 12 month pre-existing condition exclusion, 
allowed gender as a rating factor and allowed 
wider rate bands; exemption from rating 
restrictions for association plans.
1999: Repealed all product guaranteed issue; 
standardized benefit packages; and rating 
restrictions.
Down. Up. (Based 
on anecdotal 
information. 
No systematic 
pre-/post 
reform premium 
information.)
Unclear as to effects on 
increasing availability 
of options for high-risk 
subscribers.
Significantly decreased 
number of insurers.
Massachusetts
1996 law
Kirk, 2000 Small group insurers with more than 5,000 lives 
had to guarantee issue any of three standardized 
products (HMO, PPO, indemnity) in the individual 
market; rating bands (age, location, family size but 
not health status) that become tighter over time; 
only those ineligible for group can apply and, with 
exceptions, can do so only during a two-month 
annual open enrollment period; no pre-existing 
condition exclusions or waiting periods. 
Down but this could be due 
to shift to group market 
which redefined to groups 
of one or more. Data not 
available to determine.
Up, especially for 
indemnity. 
Decreased indemnity 
options but increased 
managed care options.
Number of insurers 
decreased at first and then 
increased.
Minnesota
1992 law 
(analyzed 
1992–1994)
Institute for 
Health Policy 
Solutions, 
1995
Rating bands, prohibits sale of individual policies to 
eligible employees of small employers that provide 
coverage.
No information on overall 
state coverage.
Decline in number of people 
covered by individual 
insurance policies but could 
be due to movement to 
small group insurance. 
No information. No information on whether 
increased options for high-
risk. 
Number of carriers offering 
individual coverage 
declined. 
New 
Hampshire
1994 and 1998 
laws
Department 
of Insurance, 
2001 (includes 
results of an 
independent 
1997 study). 
See also 
Feldvebel and 
Sky.
Modified community rating (age bands limited 
to 3:1, health status limited to 1.2:1); 
guaranteed issue; guaranteed renewability; 
limits on pre-existing condition exclusions 
(nine months/three months). 1998-subsidization 
mechanism via assessment on group carriers. 
Reduction in uninsured but 
not attributed to individual 
market reforms.
Decline in number of people 
covered by individual 
insurance but increase 
in number of people 
covered under small 
group insurance (defined 
to include 1–100 person 
groups).
Increased but not 
by large amount. 
Probably mostly 
due to nonreform 
causes.
Increased options for high-
risk.
Number of insurers 
declined, but insurance 
reforms (guaranteed issue 
and rating restrictions) only 
partly responsible. 
1  Suggested by table in: Nichols, Len, State Regulation. What Have We Learned So Far? Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, vol. 25, no. 1, February 2000.
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State and 
years 
analyzed Study Key reforms
Rate of insurance 
coverage (overall and in 
individual market)
Average  
premium
Availability and  
market stability 
(for high-risk individuals)
New Jersey
1993–1997 
(with additional  
data for  
1998–1999)
Swartz and 
Garnick, 
2000
Pure community rating (but no rate review); all 
product guaranteed issue; standardized benefits;
mandatory loss ratio; pay or play (a form of 
reinsurance) in which insurers had to sell in the 
individual market or pay an assessment that 
would be used to offset losses of the participating 
insurers. 
Overall state coverage rates 
not reported. Increased 
number of individually 
insured for first few years, 
but then declined.
Down for first two 
years, and then up.
(Down for high-risk, 
up over short-term 
for low-risk who 
previously bought 
through one-person 
small group or 
association plan 
markets.)
Up a lot.
New York
(1993–1997)
Hall, 2000;
Chollet and 
Kirk, 1998
Pure community rating and prior approval for 
significant rate increases; guaranteed issue 
(all products); limits on pre-existing condition 
exclusions (six months/12 months); exclusion riders 
prohibited; guaranteed renewal; demographic 
(1993) and specific condition (1996) risk 
adjustment.
Standardized HMO and Point-of-Service (POS) 
policies (no indemnity). To offer in group market, 
HMOs and PPOs have to offer in individual market. 
This requirement does not apply to indemnity 
insurers (1996).
Down for individual market 
(up for small group market).
Up a lot for 
comprehensive 
indemnity coverage, 
more moderate 
increases for HMOs.
More HMO/POS options but 
no indemnity left.
Number of insurers
decreased but more 
available for high-risk. After 
first few years, only HMO or 
POS plans were available.
Ohio
(1993–1994?)
Data:  
1992–1997
Hall, 1999 Open enrollment for some carriers and some 
policies with threshold limits. Unclear which were 
new reforms. (Premiums still subject to risk rating); 
limits on pre-existing condition exclusions (six 
months/12 months); mandatory reinsurance pool 
for open enrollment business (exceptions provided 
based on insurer’s size). 
Down overall but probably 
unrelated to nongroup 
reforms. Number of open 
enrollment nongroup 
policies increased very 
modestly. 
Not clear.
 
Not clear.
Number of insurers: some 
consolidation but unrelated 
to nongroup reforms.
Vermont
(1993–1997)
Hall, 2000 All product guaranteed issue; pure community 
rating for HMOs and BCBS; tight rate bands  
(+/–20 percent) for commercial insurers but  
can’t use health status; up to 12 month pre-existing 
condition exclusion period; standardized indemnity 
benefit (does not apply to HMOs); HMOs must  
offer in individual market. BCBS takes anyone 
whose insurer has left the state at no more than 
+/–15 percent annual premium increase. 
Varies by source of data. 
Stable or possibly up 
somewhat both in rate of 
total coverage and insured 
by individual policies. 
Up.
(No evidence of 
adverse selection 
spiral.) 
Up. 
Number of insurers: down.
Washington    
(1993 and 
1995 laws, 
analyzed 
through 1998)
Kirk, 2000;
Chollet and 
Kirk (1998)
Guaranteed issue (all products) with benefits 
similar to state’s Basic Health Plan but could 
also offer own customized benefit packages; rate 
bands and modified community rating (4:1 for age, 
family, geography); limits on pre-existing condition 
exclusions (three months/three months); no 
exclusion riders; guaranteed renewal. Only HMOs 
and POS plans (effective 1996). 
Possibly down.
(Interviews, not hard data.)
Up (but pre-reform 
data not provided).
Up.
Number of insurers: down.
Table B. State-specific findings of synthesis studies (continued)
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